The analysis begins with a brief overview of the causes and dimensions of food insecurity in Sudan (Section 2), in order to identify the groups most at risk of chronic and transitory food insecurity and thus of highest priority for targeted interventions. It continues with a review of current food insecurity interventions, to synthesise the strengths and weaknesses of alternative targeting mechanisms (Section 3). It ends with a discussion of alternative approaches to targeting, especially in Darfur (Section 4), and with a summary of the implications for targeting elsewhere in SSA (Section 5) . In discussing targeting, we shall make three important distinctions. The first is between food security interventions (FSI) which are 'explicitly' identified in the Government budget and 'implicit' FSI's which are not. Explicit FSI's include food subsidies, ration schemes or drought relief. Examples in Sudan are the wheat subsidy, the sugar distribution and drought relief. Implicit FSI's are the result of Governmentinduced distortions in foreign exchange or cereal markets. Examples in Sudan might be the over-valued Sudanese Pound and Government intervention in the market for sorghum.
The second distinction is between FSI's which are administered and those which are self-targeted. An administered FSI requires the establishment of entitlement rules and the maintenance of access registers. An example would be the sugar rationing scheme. A self-targeted FSI relies on pricing or commodity selection to exclude those not in need: an example would be a subsidy on an 'inferior' commodity consumed mostly by poor people. Finally, we shall distinguish between targeting which is socio-economic and that which is geographical. The former aims to reach groups of people defined in terms of income or asset ownership; the latter, groups defined in terms of location. Ration schemes for poor people would be an example of socio-economic targeting; drought relief to everyone in affected regions would be an example of geographical targeting.2
Introduction
This paper is about the feasibility of targeting food security interventions in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to those who really need them. The conventional wisdom is that targeting is the only way to limit the unsustainable fiscal cost of generalised food and nutrition subsidies; and that the savings brought about by limiting access to such subsidies more than compensate for the additional administrative costs that targeting entails [World Bank 1986 , PinstrupAndersen 1988 . Our purpose is to investigate whether the conventional wisdom holds true, not just in the middle income countries of Asia and Latin America from whose experience it is largely derived, but also in the poorer and more food insecure countries of SSA.
Targeting in these countries presents special difficulties: the proportion of the population in need is greater, and often more widely dispersed; administrations are much weaker; and the political constraints on redistribution are severe.
Our case study is North Sudan, and particularly its most westerly and food insecure region, Darfur. This is not an easy case. Sudan is paradigmatically food insecure, afflicted by drought, by civil war and by a food system which is both inequitable and unstable.
Darfur mirrors those problems and adds the difficulties of isolation and regional deprivation. The history of targeting is not encouraging, especially of drought relief [Keen 1988; Buchanan-Smith 1989] .
Hard cases make bad law. Nevertheless, we find grounds for optimism that targeting can be improved in Sudan; and we believe that these lessons apply more widely in SSA. The key is to focus not just on safeguarding current income and food consumption, but also on longer term livelihood interventions that reduce vulnerability: and to do this with programmes which are geographically specific, self-targeting in administrative terms and designed inter alia to support traditional community food security arrangements. Consistency in food policy at macro and micro levels is also important.
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This perspective introduces a dynamic element into the analysis: policy makers and planners are primarily concerned with the movement of a population from one category describing the degree of food insecurity to another. In Sudan, planners usually find themselves grappling with the immediate task of preventing a mildly food insecure population from becoming severely food insecure, for both transitory and chronic groups. In reality, it is very difficult to distinguish between chronic and transitory food insecurity, especially in periods of severe food insecurity, or famine, when the distinction is anyway unnecessary. A population may face conditions of 'transitory' food insecurity with remarkable frequency -very possibly every year in the lean period before the harvest. The model therefore provides an analysis which is more appropriate for practical food security planning.
Who is food insecure in Sudan and why?
There has been much debate on whether food insecurity in Sudan is caused by exogenous factors such as declining rainfall, drought and desertification or whether it is caused by social, political and ultimately economic factors [de Waal, 1989; Duffield 1990] . These two sets of causes have been combined by Maxwell [1989] into an analysis of underlying trends and short-term shocks. The underlying trends include the chronic weaknesses of the macro economy; the instability and inequity of the food system; the commercialisation of agriculture; the rapid urbanisation. 
The Targeting of Food Security Interventions in North Sudan
The food system in Sudan is subject to a high degree of intervention. In this section we review the extent to which such interventions benefit the food insecure, particularly in Darfur. We begin with the national picture, before turning to longer-term interventions at the regional level and to drought relief. We end with a review of community level responses and with a summary of findings on targeting in Sudan.
The National Picture4
The main food security interventions as they apply to the staple crops in Sudan are summarised in Figure 2 .
Rainfall increases froni North to South. In most of North Darfur the long-term average rainfall is below 400mm pa. In South Datfur it ranges up to 900mm pa. The co-efficient of variation is high, up to 55 per cent in parts of North Darfur. This account is drawn from IDS [19881. Sudan [1988] and Maxwell [1989. 19901. 54
Sorghum accounts for about three quarters of cereal production and for about two thirds of consumption. Ninety per cent of marketed surplus is generated by the large-scale mechanised rainfed sector,, which is supported by subsidised credit, a favourable exchange rate for inputs and floor price support by the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan. In addition, the national strategic reserve and buffer stock are both held in the form of sorghum. Because of its strategic importance, sorghum is subject to controls on trade.
Wheat is a largely imported commodity, with Sudan producing only 10 per cent of consumption and relying on food aid for over 80 per cent of imports. The most important food security intervention is the large subsidy on bread, which has benefited mainly urban areas. Millet accounts only for about 10 per cent of production and, as the figure shows, receives no Government support. However, it is the major food staple in Darfur. Finally, sugar is another strategic crop, which is distributed throughout the country on a ration system.
The food security interventions summarised in Figure 2 are explicit in nature, which is to say that their costs are, in principle, specified in the budget. However, in making judgements about the total size and consequences of these interventions, account must also be taken of additional implicit taxes and subsidies, caused, for example, by the distortions in the exchange rate or controls over trade. As IDS [l988j has shown, these are particularly important in the case of sorghum and wheat price interventions. Thus, the effect of the intervention in the sorghum market by the Agricultural Bank ofSudan has been to raise the market price, in some years, above the export parity price which would otherwise prevail. This effectively means that consumers are being taxed to benefit producers. Similarly, an analysis of wheat pricing policy using shadow exchange rates shows that producers are being taxed to provide an additional implicit subsidy to consumers, over and above that explicitly accounted for [ibid] . All these interventions have been reviewed in detail elsewhere [IDS 1988; Sudan 1988; Maxwell 1989 , 1990]. When they are considered as a complete package, four main themes become apparent. First, there are biases in the benefit derived from intervention, to rich over poor, urban over rural and core over periphery. This is evident in many ways. The IDS food security study showed that the main beneficiaries of the sorghum pricing policy were largescale mechanised farmers, numbering no more than 8,000 in total. The total cost of intervention in 1986/87 was LS 250 mn, of which two thirds was an implicit tax on consumers, giving an average subsidy of over LS 30,000 (approx. $US 7,000) per farm to mechanised farmers. Mechanised rainfed farming is found mostly in the core areas of the central plains of Sudan, which have benefited disproportionately from Government investment in infrastructure and agricultural research [Brighton 19881 . For example, a recent review of agricultural research findings in the Sudan showed that only two out of 1,300 publications on agronomy dealt with millet [Robinson 1987] . Similarly, the wheat subsidy is in principle available to all consumers but, in practice, is restricted to urban areas. Within urban areas, bread is normally found only in the centre of towns and not in marginal areas [Duloy 1988 ]. The one exception to this pattern of maldistribution of food security resources is the sugar subsidy, which does appear to reach many rural areas, albeit unevenly [Maxwell 1989 ].
Summary of food interventions
The second important conclusion about the package of interventions is that implicit resource transfers caused by price distortions are large compared to explicit food subsidies. A good example is the case of sorghum pricing quoted above, where the implicit transfer from consumers to producers was twice as large as the explicit cost to the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan. A similar case is that of wheat, where exchange rate over-valuation turns a producer subsidy into a tax and greatly increases the level of consumer subsidies. A third conclusion is that Sudan does not have a good track-record of targeting consumers using administrative measures. The only national food security intervention which registers recipients is the sugar distribution system, but this does not discriminate between recipients and mainly provides a method of estimating total quantities required in different districts. There is no experience either with selftargeting, for example using inferior commodities, although the proposal has been much discussed in the context of reducing the wheat subsidy by introducing wheat/sorghum mixes for bread making [IDS 1988; Duloy ibid] .
Finally, a fourth conclusion is that the size of these national transfers is very large in relation to most rural development or even emergency programmes. development efforts. This potential will always be highly variable and a development priority will therefore be to find ways to 'drought proof' local economies against dry years.5
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an existing urban bias at the expense of needy rural populations. 
Community-Level Interventions
As a contrast to Government sponsored food security interventions, we turn finally to safety-nets implemented by rural communities themselves. Surprisingly, and unlike external actions, community-based safetynets appear to target some poor people effectively. However, their effectiveness is declining as market relations spread in rural areas [Duffield 1990 ]. Within pastoral communities such as the Meidob [Hales n.d .I and the Zaghawa [Tubiana 1977 ], animals in milk are loaned by richer to poorer households for the duration of their lactation, and there are a variety of types of animal loan designed to reconstitute the herd capital of a household below a minimum viable level.
In some groups, collective shuna granaries, filled by levy on individual households in good years, and under the control of the traditional village sheikh or higher authority, were used to meet collective obligations of the group including the needs of households unable to feed themselves. No shuna stores still operate in Darfur although the physical structures can still be seen in several places. These conclusions are not encouraging, but they do suggest that there is some room to manoeuvre in Sudan. In the next section we set out guiding principles for the targeting of food security interventions in the Sudan; and illustrate their application in Darfur.
The Way Forward
There are three main lines öfattack if targeting is to be improved, dealing respectively with national food policy, longer term regional rural development programmes and short term relief. In general, we favour eliminating implicit taxes and subsidies, which tend not to benefit the poor; avoiding administrative targeting, which presents insuperable management problems; extending the scope of geographical targeting; and extending socio-economic self-targeting within the framework of project and programme support for development in the most vulnerable areas.
Our proposals tend to build on local government capability, support community level social welfare mechanisms and help poor people to develop their own production and asset-based family survival national food security interventions. The first is the most difficult and the most important: it is to reverse the bias of agricultural policy to large-scale farming in the mechanised, rainfed sector and target instead the large mass of producers in the traditional, rainfed The second reform is to eliminate the implicit and explicit taxes and subsidies which affect cereal producers and consumers, particularly for sorghum but also for wheat. As the data reported earlier showed, ABS intervention in the sorghum market has tended to transfer resources from (poor) consumers to (rich) producers; the overvalued exchange rate has an opposite (though smaller) effect in the case of wheat, leading to a distortion of production incentives. For sorghum, an alternative model of intervention [Shuttleworth 1988 ] would lift trade restrictions and concentrate ABS resources on defending a floor price that was close to the export parity price. For wheat [IDS 1988] , producers would receive a price close to the import parity price.
The third reform is to reduce the fiscal cost of the consumer subsidy on wheat, by introducing inferior wheat-sorghum flour to carry the subsidy and by charging the full market price for pure wheat flour [IDS 1988 ]. This would be a form of socio-economic self-targeting that would concentrate the benefits of the subsidy and reduce its total cost.
Long term food security at the regional level
The Darfur Food Security Plan [Swift and Gray 1989] proposes a set of measures aimed at increasing the long-term ability of chronically food insecure groups to withstand threats to their food security, including measures to increase production, improve marketing and make markets more secure, as well as measures to create and maintain local assets.
In the field of production, a twin track strategy is required to reduce variability and improve productivity in arable agriculture and extensive livestock production, especially in North Darfur. The key to higher agricultural output is the development of alluvial soil farming systems, in order to reduce agricultural pressure on ecologically marginal sandy soils. The measures needed include soil and water conservation, techniques of agroforestry and a combination of new and existing plant protection and storage technologies.
On the pastoral side, the emphasis needs to be on restocking poor pastoral households, so that they can re-establish viable herd sizes for independent production.
In terms of markets, the main change needed is to support liberalisation and integration of cereal markets, through the abolition of restrictions on grain movement and the construction of infrastructure, especially roads. In addition, however, the Regional Government should develop a small scale capacity to hold and manage emergency grain reserve stocks. Finally, contingency planning to enable government to react more effectively in a crisis is also important.
The crucial ingredients of this are a stronger early warning system, based on existing agricultural statistics, the designation of specified 'warning levels' based on indicators in the early warning system and a series of interventions to prevent destitution. These would include release of emergency stocks at Regional, Area and Rural council levels; livestock market interventions to encourage herders and farmers to de-stock early in a crisis and prevent a collapse in livestock market prices; and a public works programme to prevent a collapse in demand for cereals.
The main thrust of all these proposals is for greater targeting of national resources to the region.This was one of the key resolutions adopted by Regional Government and donor funded project personnel at a regional inter-projects meeting in 1988 [Darfur 1988] .
As long as the civil war continues, the prospects for this look bleak: and, as long as Government finances are so scarce, aid will be the primary resource for development initiatives to improve food security.
Relief Planning
The evidence shows that the targeting of relief by local government institutions is possible but difficult, and requires much more careful and clearer treatment in the planning stage of the relief operation. Relief planning must take better account of the logistical and institutional constraints to targeting.
For example, there are frequent transport problems in delivering to the most needy areas (which are often the most remote). Buchanan-Smith [1989) has suggested that a separate transport contract should be specifically drawn up for delivering relief to those areas alone, to avoid them being overlooked in favour of less remote destinations. Training is required for local government officers who are to be responsible for relief distributions. Topics to be covered include needs assessments and relief planning to try and come to a common understanding between the international community and local institutions of what relief is and who it is for [Hubbard 1988; Buchanan-Smith 1989] .
Regional relief institutions must be strengthened if they are to be able to carry out adequate supervision of targeting by local government officers. Otherwise the institutional constraints must be recognised if the relief plans are to be implementable.
Conclusion
We have seen that better targeting is possible in Sudan, despite the administrative constraints. Some of the improvements we have suggested, particularly those involving national food policy, represent significant redistribution and we do not underestimate the political difficulties [Hopkins 1988] . Others, however, may be less tendentious: we see great potential in the smaller-scale interventions based on community or local government activity. 
